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This paper describes two algorithms that use the Banzhaf power index to measure the 
power of voters in a weighted voting system.  Given a desired balance of power, these 
algorithms attempt to calculate a quota and set of weights which produce a Banzhaf 
power index that is as close as possible to the input.  The first algorithm solves the 
problem by considering quotas and sets of weights for all possible Banzhaf power 
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In this paper, we describe the traditional weighted majority game and the use of the 
Banzhaf power index to measure voter power.  We then explain the reverse game in 
which we find a quota and set of weights for a desired balance of power.  We propose 
two approaches to solving the reverse game.  The first approach is guaranteed to find an 
optimal solution but has a very large running time.  The second approach has a more 
predictable running time, but may not find the optimal answer.  We discuss the results for 
both approaches and suggest variations for future consideration. 
 
2 The Weighted Majority Game 
 
The weighted majority game describes a particular kind of election.  The election is 
weighted because each voter casts a block of votes, rather than exactly one vote.  The 
election is a majority because the number of votes needed for a measure to pass must be 
more than half of the total number of votes. 
 
Applications of the weighted majority game commonly appear in both government and 
business situations.  A typical government election may use a system similar to the 
United States Electoral College in which each state is given a particular number of votes 
based on its population.  In business, an election may be held in which the stockholder 
votes are weighted based on the number of shares of stock each holds.  An election may 
be a simple majority in which over 1/2 of the votes are needed for a measure to pass. The 
election may require more than a simple majority, perhaps over 2/3 or 3/4 of the vote. 
2.1 Terminology 
 
A weighted majority game is defined by [q: w1, w2, …, wn] where q is the quota (number 
of votes needed for a measure to pass) and wi is the weight of the ith voter. Using this 
definition, the game [51: 25, 25, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10] represents a simple majority game 




where 51/100 votes are needed for a measure to pass, and seven voters have weights of 
either 25 or 10.  Likewise, [7: 5, 3, 2] represents a game with three voters and a quota of 
seven. 
 
In this paper, q and each wi will be integers ≥  0, and q must be at least a simple majority 










By convention, we list the weights in descending order such that nwww ≥≥≥ ...21 . 
2.2 Representations of Power 
 
Generally, elections are weighted in the interest of fairness.  In a business situation, the 
person who holds the most shares in a company has the most to lose if the company 
makes a bad decision.  Therefore, it is fair for the person with the most shares to have the 
most input about a decision. 
  
The easiest way to judge the power of the voters is to simply take a straight percentage.  
If a voter has 20 percent of the votes, it seems as if he would have 20 percent of the 
power.  While this seems logical, a simple example shows that it is not completely 
accurate.  Suppose there is a shareholder who holds 51 percent of the stock of a company.  
That voter is really in full control of the company because if he votes to pass a motion, 
the motion passes, regardless of the other shareholders’ votes.  Likewise, if the 
controlling shareholder votes to reject a motion, the motion does not pass.  If a voter’s 
weight is greater than or equal to the quota, that voter really holds 100 percent of the 
power. 




2.3 The Banzhaf Index 
 
A different measure of power was proposed by John F. Banzhaf III in 1965 [1].  Banzhaf 
argued that a voter’s power is based on his ability to influence the outcome of an election.  
 
To see whether a voter can change the outcome of the election, Banzhaf first lists all the 
possible coalitions of voters and their votes.  A coalition is a set of voters who vote “Yes” 
in an election.  Consider a simple game in which there are three voters.  Each voter can 
vote only two ways – Yes or No.  There are 23 possible coalitions, shown below, where a 
“1” represents a “Yes” vote, and a “0” represents a “No” vote. 
 
Coalition # Coalition Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 
0 {} 0 0 0 
1 {V3} 0 0 1 
2 {V2} 0 1 0 
3 {V2, V3} 0 1 1 
4 {V1} 1 0 0 
5 {V1, V3} 1 0 1 
6 {V1, V2} 1 1 0 
7 {V1, V2, V3} 1 1 1 
 
Table 1:  Coalitions of voters for game of size three 
 
The second step is to determine whether the vote of each of the coalitions causes the 
motion to pass or fail.  This can be done by adding up the weights of the voters who vote 
“Yes” and comparing this sum to the quota.  If the sum is greater than or equal to the 
quota, then the motion passes.  Otherwise, the motion fails. 
 
Consider the game [51: 50, 30, 20] and the distribution of votes shown above.  Here is a 
chart showing the calculation of the sums, and the outcome of the motion: 





Coalition # Weight 1 Weight 2 Weight 3 Sum(W) Outcome 
0 0 0 0 0 Fail 
1 0 0 20 20 Fail 
2 0 30 0 30 Fail 
3 0 30 20 50 Fail 
4 50 0 0 50 Fail 
5 50 0 20 70 Pass 
6 50 30 0 80 Pass 
7 50 30 20 100 Pass 
 
Table 2:  Outcomes of all coalitions for the game [51: 50, 30, 20] 
 
The third step is to consider when a voter is pivotal in the outcome.  A voter is pivotal if 
the outcome of the vote would be changed if he (and he alone) changed his vote.  Below 
is a chart indicating whether the voter would change the outcome if he changed his vote: 
 
Coalition # Pivotal 1 Pivotal 2 Pivotal 3 
0 No No No 
1 Yes No No 
2 Yes No No 
3 Yes No No 
4 No Yes Yes 
5 Yes No Yes 
6 Yes Yes No 
7 Yes No No 









Table 3:  Pivotal voters for the game [51: 50, 30, 20] 
 




The forth and final step is to add up the number of times each voter is pivotal, and to 
divide this number by the total number of times any voter is pivotal.  We denote the 










(=β  or )20. ,20. ,60(.=β .   
 
It’s interesting to note that in our example, even though Voter #2 has 10 more votes than 
Voter #3, both have the same ability to change the outcome. 
 
3 Analysis of Algorithm for Calculating Banzhaf Index 
 
The algorithm described in Section 2.3 for calculating the Banzhaf index is an iterative 
algorithm that involves counting combinations of voter coalitions.  Even considering all 
coalitions is a task requiring exponential time since there are 2n coalitions, where n is the 
number of voters. 
3.1 Overview of Running Time 
 
Although there are some shortcuts that can speed up the calculations for the Banzhaf 
index, the algorithm for a single game runs in exponential time.  Yasuko and Tomomi 
Matsui [4] proved that the problem is NP-hard in 2001.   
 
Various improvements to the algorithm have been made to bring the running time down 
from O(n2n), but we use the original Banzhaf index calculation in this paper.  These 
improvements include the use of generating functions as implemented in Mathematica by 
P. Tannenbaum [7]. 
3.2 Shortcut 
 
A symmetry exists in the third step of Section 2.3 which simplifies the calculation of the 
Banzhaf index.  Pivotal votes were defined as votes that “changed the outcome” of the 




election.  In reality, changing the outcome from Pass to Fail happens exactly as 
frequently as changing the outcome from Fail to Pass.  Therefore, we consider only one 
of the cases and multiply the result by two to get the actual number of pivotal votes.  
Following is an explanation of why this shortcut is valid. 
 
Consider two coalitions of voters A and B where every voter votes the same in A and B, 
except one arbitrary voter i, who votes yes in A and no in B.   
 
An example for a game of size 4 might have the following values: 
 i = 2, the second voter. 
 A = {V1, V2} = (1,1,0,0) where voters 1 & 2 vote yes, and voters 3 & 4 vote no. 
 B = {V1} = (1,0,0,0) where voter 1 votes yes, and voters 2, 3, & 4 vote no. 
 
We will show that A and B are symmetrical:  voter i is pivotal in A if and only if voter i 
is pivotal in B. 
 
First, define Y as the set of voters that are not i who vote yes, and N as the set of voters 
that are not i who vote no.  Because of the way we define A and B, Y and N are the same 
for games A and B.  For the example listed above, Y = {1} and N = {3, 4}. 
 
Suppose voter i is pivotal in A.  Since voter i votes yes in A, the measure must pass in A, 












Now suppose voter i is not pivotal in B.  That means that the measure either 
1)  fails in B, but would not pass even with i’s vote, or  
2)  passes in B, with or without i’s vote.  
However, we know neither of these cases is true because 
1) Equation 1 states that the measure passes with i’s vote, and  




2) Equation 2 states that the measure fails without i’s vote.  
 
Therefore, by contradiction, we see that voter i must be pivotal in B if he is pivotal in A. 
 
Now we will show that if voter i is not pivotal in A, he is not pivotal in B, either. 
 
Suppose voter i is not pivotal in A.  This can happen in two cases:   
 












Now suppose voter i is pivotal in B.  That means that the measure either 
1)  passes in B, but without i’s vote would fail, or  
2)  fails in B, but with i’s vote would pass..  
However, we know neither of these cases are true because 
1)  Equation 3 states that the measure would fail even without i’s vote, and  
2)  Equation 4 states that the measure would fail with i’s vote.  
 












Now suppose voter i is pivotal in B.  That means that the measure either 
1)  passes in B, but without i’s  vote would fail, or 
2)  fails in B, but with i’s vote would pass.  
But, we know neither of these cases is true because 
1)  Equation 6 states that the measure would pass without i’s vote, and  




2)  Equation 6 states that the measure would pass without i’s vot e. 
 
Therefore, by contradiction, we see that voter i must not be pivotal in B if he is not 
pivotal in A. 
3.3 Running Time Analysis of Algorithm 
 
The following psuedocode shows the breakdown of the algorithm described in section 2.3 
above.  The running time of the complete algorithm is O(n2n). 
 
Loop through the 2n possible distributions of votes       O(2n) 
 Calculate the outcome of the election based on the distribution   O(n) 
 If the outcome is Pass              O(1) 
  Loop through the n players           O(n) 
   If the player’s vote is pivotal in current game      O(1) 
    Count the vote for the player         O(1) 
   End If 
  End Loop 
 End If 
End Loop 
Loop through the n players             O(n) 
 Divide the player’s pivotal votes by the total pivotal votes     O(1) 
End Loop 
 
4 Reversing the Weighted Majority Game 
 
The algorithm used to find the Banzhaf indices answers the question of how much power 
voters in a weighted voting system have.  Sometimes, however, the question is reversed.  
Instead of asking how much power voters have in a given situation, the question is how 
to create a situation in which the voters have a given balance of power. 
 




In this problem, the inputs and outputs of the weighted majority game are reversed.  In 
the traditional game, the inputs were the quota and set of weights [q: w1, w2, …, wn] 
while the outputs were the Banzhaf power indices ) ..., , ,( 21 nββββ = .  In the reverse 
game, the input is a desired power index ) ..., , ,( 21 nPPPP =  and the outputs are  
[q: w1, w2, …, wn].   
 
The terminology “power indices” is used in the reverse game instead of “Banzhaf power 
indices” which is used in the traditional game.  The distinction between the two is a small 
but important one: there is a finite number of Banzhaf power indices for a game of a 
given size, but we do not restrict the input of the reverse game to this finite set. 
 
To illustrate this point, we will consider a game of size 2.  We will look at the finite 
nature of Banzhaf indices later on in Section 5.1, but for now we will think about it 
intuitively.  When we have only two voters, there are only two ways to balance power 
between them.  Either one voter has all of the power )0,1(=β , or the two voters have 
equal power )5,.5(.=β .  When we run the reverse game, however, we allow input that is 
not exactly a Banzhaf index.  For instance, we can run the algorithm for )02,.98(.=P .  In 
this case, our algorithm will return a quota and set of weights that generates )0,1(=β  
because this Banzhaf index is closer than )5,.5(.=β . 
 









q  and nwww ≥≥≥ ...21 . 
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5 Approach #1:  Find All Solutions 
 
One way to find the quota and set of weights for a desired balance of power is to find all 
possible Banzhaf indices for n voters, and choose the one closest to the input.  This 
approach uses the idea that many games are equivalent to each other, so there are only a 
finite number of Banzhaf indices for a certain number of voters.  While this approach is 
guaranteed to find an optimal solution, the running time makes it an expensive choice. 
5.1 Correctness of Assumptions 
 
We have made two broad statements that require further explanation. The first statement 
is that many games are equivalent to each other.  Equivalent games are those that produce 
the same Banzhaf index even though they have different quotas or a different set of 
weights. The second statement is that there are a finite number of Banzhaf indices for a 
game of a given size.   
 
First, we will show that it is possible for two games to be equivalent.  Second, we will 
show that there are a finite number of outcomes.  After we show both these statements to 
be true, it is clear that many games are equivalent.   
 
The game we discussed in Section 2 had the input of [51: 50, 30, 20] and output of 
)20,.20,.60(.=β .  We will show that a game with the input of, [51: 50, 25, 25], also has 
an outcome of )20,.20,.60(.=β . 
 
Below is the chart showing whether the measure passes or fails based on every possible 
coalition of voters: 





Votes (0 = No, 1 = Yes) Weights (based on votes) Coali-





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fail 
1 0 0 1 0 0 25 25 Fail 
2 0 1 0 0 25 0 25 Fail 
3 0 1 1 0 25 25 50 Fail 
4 1 0 0 50 0 0 50 Fail 
5 1 0 1 50 0 25 75 Pass 
6 1 1 0 50 25 0 75 Pass 
7 1 1 1 50 25 25 100 Pass 
 
Table 4: Coalitions and outcomes for the game [51: 50, 25, 25] 
 
Below is a chart indicating whether the voter would change the outcome if he changed 
his vote: 
 
Coalition # Pivotal 1 Pivotal 2 Pivotal 3 
0 No No No 
1 Yes No No 
2 Yes No No 
3 Yes No No 
4 No Yes Yes 
5 Yes No Yes 
6 Yes Yes No 
7 Yes No No 









Table 5: Pivotal votes for the game [51: 50, 25, 25]  
 




This is the same chart as listed in section 2 for the game [51: 50, 30, 20], and the Banzhaf 
index is the same as well: )20,.20,.60(.=β  
 
Next, we show that there are a finite number of Banzhaf indices for a game of a given 
size by finding an upper bound on this number.  One upper bound can be derived from 
the Figure 5 above.  First of all, there are 2n possible coalitions of voters.  Each voter has 
two options (to be pivotal, or not to be pivotal) for each of the 2n coalitions.  So there are 
at most 
n22  possible total outcomes for games of size n. 
 
In reality, there are at least two reasons that the actual number of solutions would be less 
than the upper bound described above.  First, we restrict the game with the two rules 1) q 
is greater than half the sum of the weights, and 2) the weights are listed in decreasing 
order from left to right.  Secondly, many outcomes would be equivalent because they 






















Choosing all games means that we need to run the Banzhaf algorithm for sets of weights 
that are ordered in all possible ways.  To accomplish this, we set an arbitrary upper 
bound, and choose all sets of weights that are made up of integers between zero and the 
arbitrary upper bound.  For each of the sets of weights, we then choose valid q’s to 
generate complete games. 
 
To establish the arbitrary upper bound, we use the concept of “spacing”.  We need to 
leave enough “space” between the weights of the games so that we can discover all the 
possible orderings of weights.   
 
 




We start by thinking of the weights from right to left.  The weight on the far right, Wn is 
going to be the lowest weight because we list the weights in descending order.  The next 
weight, Wn-1 can be either equal to Wn, or greater than it.  We need to leave 1 space 
between these weights so that when we assign weights, we can assign either equal 
weights or unequal weights.  We’ll denote this spacing between W n-1 and Wn by: 
 
Space(Wn-1,Wn ) = 1 
 
Now we’ll consider the next weight, W n-2.  Like the previous case, we need to leave 1 
space so that Wn-2 can be equal or greater than wn-1.  Additionally, we need to leave 1 
space so that the weight of the coalition {Wn, Wn-1} can be less than or equal to Wn-2. 
 
Space(Wn-2, Wn-1) = 2 
 
For the next weight, Wn-3, we leave 1 space so that it can be equal or greater than Wn-2.  
We leave one space for each of the 3C2 = 3 coalitions of size 2:  {Wn,Wn-1}, {Wn, Wn-2}, 
{Wn-1,Wn-2}.  We leave one space for the 3C3 = 1 coalition of size 3: {Wn, Wn-1, Wn-2}. 
 
Space(Wn-3, Wn-2) = 5 
 
Similarly, for the next weight, Wn-4, we leave 1 space so that it can be equal or greater 
than Wn-3, 1 space for each of the 4C2 = 6 coalitions of size 2, 1 space for each of the 4C3 
= 4 coalitions of size 3, and 1 space for the 4C4 = 1 coalition of size 4. 
 
Space(Wn-4,Wn-3) = 12 
 
We are running the algorithm for games of size 2, 3, 4, and 5.  For each of these games, 
n2 is sufficiently large to use as our arbitrary upper bound.  For games of size 2, we need 
to leave at least one space between the two weights, so looping through weights from 0 to 
4 is sufficient.  For games of size 3, we need to leave at least 1 space between the last two 
weights, and at least 2 spaces between the first two weights.  Again, n2 is sufficient 




because looping from 0 to 9 allows for this spacing.  Likewise, games of size 4 need a 
total of 1 + 2 + 5 = 8 spaces between the various weights, and looping from 0 to 16 
allows enough spacing.  Finally, games of size 5 need 1 + 2 + 5 + 12 = 20 spaces, and 
looping from 0 to 25 allows enough spacing. 
 
Now that the arbitrary upper bound has been established, we can look at the remaining 
algorithm: 
1) Loop through all legal sets of weights from (0,…,0) to (n 2,…,n 2) 
2)   Loop through all partial sums of the weights from wn to w1+…+w n 
3)    Assign two values to q for each partial sum x: x and x-1 
4)     Run the Banzhaf algorithm for each of the q’s and weights  
5)      If a new Banzhaf index is found, add it to the list 
 
Details of the algorithm: 
 
1)  Assigning the weights is a simple matter of counting in base n2+1.  We start with all 
weights of zero, then begin working our way from right to left, incrementing the weights 
up to n2.  For example, size 2 would look something like this: (0,0), (0,1), (0,2), (0,3), 
(0,4), (1,0), (1,1), (1,2), (1,3), (1,4), (2,0), …, (4,3), (4,4)  
 
2)  We use a binary number counting method to find all the partial sums of the weights.  
These partial sums correspond with the coalitions of voters.  For example, in games of 
size six, we count from 0 to 26 and add all the weights whose bits are turned on.  If the 
counter is at 100110, we add the weights W1 + W4 + W5 because these weights are turned 
on with a 1 instead of 0. 
 
3)  We choose q to be both the partial sum calculated in step 2 above, and one less than 
this partial sum.  This allows us to model games when the partial sum is greater than or 
equal to q and games where the partial sum  is less than q. 
 




4)  We run the Banzhaf algorithm on each of the q’s and weights to generate a Banzhaf 
power index. 
 
5)  We add this Banzhaf index to the list if it has not already been found.  A Banzhaf 
Index B is equivalent to a previously found Index B’ if it has the same decimal 
representation for B1,B2,…,B n. 
 
Running Time: 
1) O(n2n) to count in base n2+1 from all 0’s to all 2 n’s  
2) O(2n) to count n digits in binary 
3) O(1) to choose 2 values of q 
4) O(n2n) to run the regular Banzhaf algorithm 
5) O(2nn2n+1) to add an item to the list since it takes O(n) time to check if two Banzhaf 
Indices are the same, and the size of the list may be as big as 2nn2n. 
 
Total Running Time:  O(n2n)(2n)(n2n)(2nn2n+1) = O(2(3n)n2(2n+1)) 
5.3 Solving the Problem 
 
Once all the possible Banzhaf indices have been found for a given size game, we need to 
solve the actual problem of returning a set of optimal weights for a given Banzhaf index.  
To do this, we simply loop through the list of Banzhaf indices, and calculate their 
“closeness” to the input.  If P = (P 1, P2, … , P n) is the input, and B=(B1,B2, … , B n) is one 







.  We return 
the solution with the lowest closeness score. 
 
The running time is unaffected by the final step because the selection runs in 
O(n*(number of solutions)) time.  The total running time remains O(2(3n)n2(2n+1)). 






All possible Banzhaf outcomes were calculated for games up to size five.  Once these 
possible games were calculated, any Banzhaf Index could be found in a single pass 
through the solutions in linear time.  The running times that are listed were obtained 
using a PC with a 900MHz Pentium 3 processor.  These running times are intended to 
give a rough idea of the relative time the algorithm takes across various sized games.  
The times are snapshots of the PC’s clock before and after the algorithm was run, and this 
clock is accurate to the nearest millisecond. 
 
Size 2 Game – 2 possible outcomes (Running Time = .000 seconds) 
Weights Q Number of Pivotal Votes  Banzhaf Indices 
W1 W2  V1 V2 Sum  B1 B2 
1 0 1 4 0 4  1.000 0.000 
1 1 2 2 2 4  0.500 0.500 
 
Table 6: All Banzhaf indices for games of size two 





Size 3 Game – 4 possible outcomes (Running Time = .050 seconds) 
Weights Q Number of Pivotal Votes Banzhaf Indices 
W1 W2 W3   V1 V2 V3 Sum B1 B2 B3 
1 1 1 2 4 4 4 12 0.333 0.333 0.333 
1 1 0 2 4 4 0 8 0.500 0.500 0.000 
2 1 1 3 6 2 2 10 0.600 0.200 0.200 
1 0 0 1 8 0 0 8 1.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 7: All Banzhaf indices for games of size 3 
Size 4 Game – 12 possible outcomes    (Running Time = 3.400 seconds) 
Weights Q Number of Pivotal Votes Banzhaf Indices 
W1 W2 W3 W4   V1 V2 V3 V4 Sum B1 B2 B3 B4 
1 1 1 1 3 6 6 6 6 24 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 
2 2 1 1 4 8 8 4 4 24 0.333 0.333 0.167 0.167 
1 1 1 0 2 8 8 8 0 24 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.000 
2 2 1 1 5 6 6 2 2 16 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 
2 1 1 1 4 8 4 4 4 20 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.200 
3 2 2 1 5 10 6 6 2 24 0.417 0.250 0.250 0.083 
2 1 1 1 3 12 4 4 4 24 0.500 0.167 0.167 0.167 
3 2 1 1 5 10 6 2 2 20 0.500 0.300 0.100 0.100 
1 1 0 0 2 8 8 0 0 16 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000 
2 1 1 0 3 12 4 4 0 20 0.600 0.200 0.200 0.000 
3 1 1 1 4 14 2 2 2 20 0.700 0.100 0.100 0.100 
1 0 0 0 1 16 0 0 0 16 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 8: All Banzhaf indices for games of size 4 





Size 5 Game – 57 possible outcomes (Running Time = 8 minutes, 10.600 seconds) 
Weights Q Number of Pivotal Votes Banzhaf Indices 
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5   V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 Sum B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
1 1 1 1 1 3 12 12 12 12 12 60 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
2 2 2 1 1 6 10 10 10 6 6 42 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.143 0.143 
3 3 2 2 2 7 14 14 10 10 10 58 0.241 0.241 0.172 0.172 0.172 
1 1 1 1 0 3 12 12 12 12 0 48 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 
2 2 2 1 1 5 14 14 14 6 6 54 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.111 0.111 
3 3 2 2 1 8 12 12 8 8 4 44 0.273 0.273 0.182 0.182 0.091 
2 2 2 1 1 7 6 6 6 2 2 22 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.091 0.091 
3 3 2 2 1 7 14 14 10 10 2 50 0.28 0.28 0.2 0.2 0.04 
4 3 3 2 2 8 16 12 12 8 8 56 0.286 0.214 0.214 0.143 0.143 
2 2 1 1 1 4 16 16 8 8 8 56 0.286 0.286 0.143 0.143 0.143 
2 1 1 1 1 5 10 6 6 6 6 34 0.294 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 
3 2 2 2 1 7 14 10 10 10 2 46 0.304 0.217 0.217 0.217 0.043 
2 2 1 1 1 5 14 14 6 6 6 46 0.304 0.304 0.13 0.13 0.13 
4 3 3 2 1 8 16 12 12 8 4 52 0.308 0.231 0.231 0.154 0.077 
3 3 2 1 1 6 16 16 12 4 4 52 0.308 0.308 0.231 0.077 0.077 
3 2 2 2 1 6 18 10 10 10 6 54 0.333 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.111 
3 2 2 1 1 7 12 8 8 4 4 36 0.333 0.222 0.222 0.111 0.111 
4 3 2 2 1 8 16 12 8 8 4 48 0.333 0.25 0.167 0.167 0.083 
5 4 3 2 2 9 18 14 10 6 6 54 0.333 0.259 0.185 0.111 0.111 
2 2 1 1 0 4 16 16 8 8 0 48 0.333 0.333 0.167 0.167 0 
3 3 2 1 1 8 10 10 6 2 2 30 0.333 0.333 0.2 0.067 0.067 
1 1 1 0 0 2 16 16 16 0 0 48 0.333 0.333 0.333 0 0 
3 2 2 1 1 6 18 10 10 6 6 50 0.36 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.12 
5 4 3 2 1 9 18 14 10 6 2 50 0.36 0.28 0.2 0.12 0.04 
4 3 3 1 1 7 18 14 14 2 2 50 0.36 0.28 0.28 0.04 0.04 
3 3 1 1 1 6 16 16 4 4 4 44 0.364 0.364 0.091 0.091 0.091 
4 3 2 2 1 9 14 10 6 6 2 38 0.368 0.263 0.158 0.158 0.053 
2 2 1 1 0 5 12 12 4 4 0 32 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0 
2 1 1 1 1 4 20 8 8 8 8 52 0.385 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 
4 3 2 2 1 7 20 12 8 8 4 52 0.385 0.231 0.154 0.154 0.077 
3 2 2 1 1 5 20 12 12 4 4 52 0.385 0.231 0.231 0.077 0.077 
5 4 2 2 1 9 18 14 6 6 2 46 0.391 0.304 0.13 0.13 0.043 




Size 5 game (continued) 
Weights Q Number of Pivotal Votes Banzhaf Indices 
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5   V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 Sum B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
2 1 1 1 0 4 16 8 8 8 0 40 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 
3 2 1 1 1 6 16 12 4 4 4 40 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
3 3 1 1 1 7 14 14 2 2 2 34 0.412 0.412 0.059 0.059 0.059 
4 3 2 1 1 7 20 12 8 4 4 48 0.417 0.25 0.167 0.083 0.083 
3 2 2 1 0 5 20 12 12 4 0 48 0.417 0.25 0.25 0.083 0 
5 3 2 2 1 9 18 10 6 6 2 42 0.429 0.238 0.143 0.143 0.048 
3 2 1 1 1 5 22 10 6 6 6 50 0.44 0.2 0.12 0.12 0.12 
5 3 3 2 1 8 22 10 10 6 2 50 0.44 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.04 
4 2 2 1 1 7 20 8 8 4 4 44 0.455 0.182 0.182 0.091 0.091 
4 3 1 1 1 7 18 14 2 2 2 38 0.474 0.368 0.053 0.053 0.053 
3 1 1 1 1 5 22 6 6 6 6 46 0.478 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
5 3 3 1 1 8 22 10 10 2 2 46 0.478 0.217 0.217 0.043 0.043 
2 1 1 1 0 3 24 8 8 8 0 48 0.5 0.167 0.167 0.167 0 
4 2 2 1 1 6 24 8 8 4 4 48 0.5 0.167 0.167 0.083 0.083 
3 2 1 1 0 5 20 12 4 4 0 40 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 2 16 16 0 0 0 32 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 
5 3 2 1 1 8 22 10 6 2 2 42 0.524 0.238 0.143 0.048 0.048 
4 2 1 1 1 6 24 8 4 4 4 44 0.545 0.182 0.091 0.091 0.091 
5 2 2 2 1 7 26 6 6 6 2 46 0.565 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.043 
2 1 1 0 0 3 24 8 8 0 0 40 0.6 0.2 0.2 0 0 
5 2 2 1 1 7 26 6 6 2 2 42 0.619 0.143 0.143 0.048 0.048 
3 1 1 1 1 4 28 4 4 4 4 44 0.636 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 
3 1 1 1 0 4 28 4 4 4 0 40 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 
4 1 1 1 1 5 30 2 2 2 2 38 0.789 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 
1 0 0 0 0 1 32 0 0 0 0 32 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 9: All Banzhaf indices for games of size 5 






Suppose we are given a Power index of P=(0.416, 0.287, 0.177, 0.07, 0.05).  The first 
step of the solution is to generate all the Banzhaf indices for games of size 5.  We’ve 
already done this in Table 9, so we’ll use these Banzhaf results.   
 








.  This calculation is shown in Table 10 on the next page. 
 
The final step is to choose the solution with the lowest closeness.  In Table 10, the 
solution with the lowest closeness is shown in bold type.  The lowest closeness is 0.094, 
and the Banzhaf index which generated it is B = (0.417, 0.25, 0.167, 0.083, 0.083).  The 
closeness calculation for this solution is expanded below: 
 
 0.094 = |0.416 - 0.417| + |0.287 - 0.25| + |0.177 - 0.167| + |0.07 - 0.083| + |0.05 - 
0.083| 
 
The quota and set of weights that generated B = (0.417, 0.25, 0.167, 0.083, 0.083) can be 
found in Table 9 above in bold type: (7: 4, 3, 2, 1, 1).  This quota and set of weights is 
our solution to the game P = (0.477, 0.162, 0.158, 0.149, 0.054). 





Banzhaf Indices Close-  Banzhaf Indices (continued) Close- 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 ness  B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 ness 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.606  0.385 0.231 0.154 0.154 0.077 0.221 
0.238 0.238 0.238 0.143 0.143 0.454  0.385 0.231 0.231 0.077 0.077 0.175 
0.241 0.241 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.45  0.391 0.304 0.13 0.13 0.043 0.156 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.506  0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.306 
0.259 0.259 0.259 0.111 0.111 0.369  0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.186 
0.273 0.273 0.182 0.182 0.091 0.315  0.412 0.412 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.267 
0.273 0.273 0.273 0.091 0.091 0.315  0.417 0.25 0.167 0.083 0.083 0.094 
0.28 0.28 0.2 0.2 0.04 0.306  0.417 0.25 0.25 0.083 0 0.174 
0.286 0.214 0.214 0.143 0.143 0.406  0.429 0.238 0.143 0.143 0.048 0.171 
0.286 0.286 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.331  0.44 0.2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.288 
0.294 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.466  0.44 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.04 0.194 
0.304 0.217 0.217 0.217 0.043 0.376  0.455 0.182 0.182 0.091 0.091 0.211 
0.304 0.304 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.316  0.474 0.368 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.283 
0.308 0.231 0.231 0.154 0.077 0.329  0.478 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.406 
0.308 0.308 0.231 0.077 0.077 0.217  0.478 0.217 0.217 0.043 0.043 0.206 
0.333 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.111 0.369  0.5 0.167 0.167 0.167 0 0.361 
0.333 0.222 0.222 0.111 0.111 0.295  0.5 0.167 0.167 0.083 0.083 0.26 
0.333 0.25 0.167 0.167 0.083 0.26  0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 0.254 
0.333 0.259 0.185 0.111 0.111 0.221  0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.594 
0.333 0.333 0.167 0.167 0 0.286  0.524 0.238 0.143 0.048 0.048 0.215 
0.333 0.333 0.2 0.067 0.067 0.172  0.545 0.182 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.382 
0.333 0.333 0.333 0 0 0.405  0.565 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.043 0.42 
0.36 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.12 0.286  0.6 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.414 
0.36 0.28 0.2 0.12 0.04 0.146  0.619 0.143 0.143 0.048 0.048 0.405 
0.36 0.28 0.28 0.04 0.04 0.206  0.636 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.564 
0.364 0.364 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.277  0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.628 
0.368 0.263 0.158 0.158 0.053 0.182  0.789 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.751 
0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0 0.286  1 0 0 0 0 1.168 
0.385 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.375        
 
Table 10: Closeness calculation for approach 1 example 




6 Approach #2:  Use a Hybrid Genetic Algorithm 
 
Another way to find a quota and set of weights for a given balance of power is to use a 
less time-consuming guess-and-check algorithm.  The algorithm we present in this 
section is not guaranteed to find an optimal solution, but we have seen that it returns very 
good results. 
 
This approach uses a combination of a genetic algorithm and a greedy algorithm.  We 
will first define some of the terminology used to describe the genetic algorithm.  Then we 
will describe the actual algorithm and the results it achieved. 
6.1 Terminology 
 
Genetic algorithms model a problem as a population of organisms that reproduce over 
time.  The algorithm that controls reproduction ensures that the traits of the most fit 
organisms stay in the population.  Hence, when the algorithm is finished, the most fit 
organism is the solution to the problem. 
 
Organism:  An object representing one solution to the problem.   In our case, the 
organism consists of a quota, a set of weights, the calculated Banzhaf index, and a fitness 
score indicating how far away the Banzhaf index is from the desired Power index. 
 
Fitness:  A score indicating the quality of the solution represented by the organism.  In 
our case, the best possible organism is one whose Banzhaf index exactly matches the 
desired power index.  We use the following function to calculate the fitness of an 





||  where F is the fitness, n is the number of voters, P is 
the desired power index, and B is the calculated Banzhaf index of a game.  The sum of 
the absolute values indicates how close the solution is to the desired index.  Closeness is 
best when it is a low number, and fitness is best when it is a high number.  Subtracting 
from n adjusts the fitness accordingly.  An organism whose closeness is n would have 




every Bi one away from its corresponding Pi.  This is the worst possible solution, so its 
fitness is zero. 
 
Population:  A set of organisms.  In our case, the population is a set of games. 
 
Generation:  A population at a given time during the algorithm. 
 
Crossover:  A function that is used to combine two organisms (parents) to create a new 
organism (child).  In most genetic algorithms, the properties of an organism are encoded 
in a string known as a chromosome.  Crossovers combine parts of the encoded strings 
from both parents to generate a child.  Generally, the choice of which genetic material 
should come from one parent, and which genetic material should come from the other is 
based on random cut-points in the chromosome.  At the random cut-point, the genetic 
material is switched from one parent to the other.  In our case, we use a greedy algorithm 
to combine parents instead of a strict chromosome crossover.  We choose two games as 
the parents (Mom and Dad).  We then loop through the individual Banzhaf scores from 1 
to n.  If Mom’s Banzhaf score is best for the i th voter (i.e., if |Pi – MomBi| < |Pi – DadBi|) 
then we choose Mom’s weight for the child’s i th weight.  Otherwise we choose Dad’s 
weight for the ith weight. 
 
Mutation:  A random change in the properties of an organism that occurs with a given 
probability.  In our case, when a mutation occurs, we randomly change one of the weights 
of the game.  In order to keep the sum of the weights constant, we also choose a 
counterweight (a different weight used to balance the mutation).  We add a random 
number to the chosen weight, and then subtract the same number from the chosen 
counterweight. 
 
Reproduction:  An algorithm that is run to generate the population of the next 
generation.  In our case, we select the next generation with a combination of greedy 
choices, crossovers, and mutations. 
 




Parameters: Settings that are assigned at run-time to control the algorithm.  We have 
chosen a fixed set of parameters to use in our tests, but other values might be considered 
in future tests.   The following parameters were used to produce the results listed in 
section 6.4: 
1. Number of Voters:  3 to 10   
This is determined by the user input.  
2. Sum of Weights:  100   
We use a fixed value so that the weights of every game add up to the same value.  
This gives us a constant basis for game comparison. 
3. Quota Step:  5   
In order to save time, we do not try every valid quota in our algorithm.  Instead, 
we try only every 5th valid quota.  Valid quotas are integers that are greater than 
half of the sum of the weights. 
4. Maximum Quota:  2/3 
This parameter is another time-saver.  We stop trying quota values when they are 
more than 2/3 of the sum of the weights. 
5. Number of Generations:  5 
The number of times a population is produced, either by initialization or 
reproduction from a previous generation. 
6. Population Size:  100 
The number of organisms in the population of any generation. 
7. Equality Percentage:  10% 
This percentage represents a greedy adjustment we make to the initial population.   
When we initialize the population, we choose a certain amount of games that have 
two or more equal weights.  This adjustment is made because we found that 
randomly generating numbers rarely creates games with equal weights. 
8. Parent Percentage:  10% 
The percentage of parents that we choose to be a part of the next generation.   
9. Mutation Percentage:  10% 
The likelihood that a mutation will occur in an organism. 






1. Get input P = (p1, p2, …, p n).  This is the balance of power we would like to obtain. 
2. Loop through a list of quotas.  Start with one more than half of the sum of the 
weights, then try every 5th q up to 2/3 of the sum of the weights. 
3. Initialize the population of the first generation with 100 games using the 
following three methods: 
a. Assign the first organism with a greedy method. Set the weights in the same 
proportion as P for the first game of the population.  For example, if we are 
keeping the sum of the weights equal to 100 and P = (.5, .25, .25) the first 
organism will have the weights (50, 25, 25) 
b. Add 10% of the population using games that contain at least 2 equal weights.  
Randomly select a number x between 2 and n.  Assign x of the weights in the 
game to the same value.  Then randomly choose the remaining weights.  Sort 
the weights to preserve the descending order. 
c. Randomly generate all of the weights for the remaining games.  Again, sort 
the weights to preserve the descending order. 
4. Calculate the Banzhaf indices for each of the 100 games in the population. 
5. Calculate the fitness for each of the 100 games in the population. 
6. Let the population reproduce to create the next using the following methods: 
a. Choose the best game from the current population to be the first organism in 
the next generation. 
b. Choose 10% of the current population to copy into the next generation.  
Instead of randomly choosing 10% of the games, use a proportional selection 
scheme so that better games are more likely to be chosen.  The probability that 
a game will be chosen is determined by dividing the game’s fitness score by 
the sum of all the fitness scores in the population. 
c. Choose the remaining games by crossover.  Two different parents are chosen 
using the same proportional selection scheme as described in (b) above.  The 
crossover operation is run to determine each of the child’s weights.  If the sum 
of the child’s weights does not add up to the Sum of Weights parameter,  an 




adjustment is made to one of the weights (chosen randomly).  Re-sort the 
weights to preserve the descending order. 
d. Apply mutations with a given probability of 10%.  Loop through all the games 
in the population we just created.  Pick a number between 1 and 100.  If the 
number falls between 1 and 10, the mutation applies.  When the mutation 
applies, we randomly select a weight and counterweight from the game.  We 
then randomly choose an adjustment, add the adjustment to the weight, and 
subtract it from the counterweight.  We shrink the adjustment if it caused a 
weight to be negative, or greater than the Sum of Weights parameter, and then 
re-sort the weights to preserve the descending order. 
7. Return to step 4, 5 and 6, creating generations until a total of 5 generations have 
been considered 
8. Choose the best game from the 5th generation.  If this is the best game that has 
been considered for all the q, remember it as the best game. 
9. Repeat from step 2 until all q have been considered. 
10. Return the Banzhaf index of the best game as the solution to the problem. 
 
Running Time: 
The running time of this algorithm is dictated by the running time of the Banzhaf 
algorithm itself, which we showed in Section 3 to have a running time of O(n2n).  We run 
this algorithm a constant number of times, based on the parameters of the game:   
 
 Step)Quota





Because we generated all of the possible Banzhaf Indices for games up to size 5, we 
know the optimal answer for a desired power index.  Therefore, we can say how many 
optimal answers were found for games up to size 5. 
 




The hybrid genetic algorithm was run on 1000 games constructed with randomly chosen 
weights for each of the game sizes listed in the table of results below.  It is interesting to 
note that the optimal answer was found over 97% of the time for all three known game 













Seconds per Game 
3 0.208 0.007 0.398 100 0.558 
4 0.141 0.004 0.366 99.9 0.678 
5 0.092 0.025 0.297 97.4 0.855 
 
Table 11: Results for games with known optimal solutions 
 
Larger games used a different metric.  Since all solutions are not available for these 











Seconds per Game 
6 0.061 0.011 0.190 1.211 
7 0.053 0.010 0.192 2.154 
8 0.050 0.011 0.150 3.882 
9 0.049 0.018 0.108 8.157 
10 0.050 0.015 0.128 16.437 
 
Table 12: Results for games with unknown optimal solutions 
6.5 Example 
 
To illustrate the hybrid genetic algorithm, we will use the same example presented in 
Section 5.5.  In this example, the desired power index was P = (0.477, 0.162, 0.158, 
0.149, 0.054).  The Banzhaf index that generated the lowest closeness score (0.094) was  




B = (0.417, 0.25, 0.167, 0.083, 0.083).  One quota and set of weights that generated this 
Banzhaf index was: (7: 4, 3, 2, 1, 1). 
 
The charts below illustrate the closeness scores of the organisms in each of the five 
generations.  These organisms have been sorted by closeness so that the trend is clear.  
With each new generation, more organisms have better closeness scores. 
 
The quota and set of weights that was actually generated by this run of the hybrid genetic 
algorithm is (56: 48, 37, 32, 13, 9, 6).  This is one of many solutions that yielded a 
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Figure 1: Closeness of organisms in population where q = 51 
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Figure 3: Closeness of organisms in population where q = 61 
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Figure 4: Closeness of organisms in population where q = 66 
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed two approaches to finding optimal weights and quota for a 
desired balance of power.  The first approach found all solutions for a game of a given 
size, and then chose the best one.  This approach was shown to find an optimal solution 
for all cases at the expense of a very large running time.  The second approach used a 
hybrid genetic algorithm to find solutions.  This approach has a more predictable running 
time, but was not guaranteed to find the optimal answer. 
 
Future work may include extending the algorithms to work with other power 
measurements, such as the Shapely-Shubik power index [6].  Also, it would be interesting 
to take into consideration larger sized games.  Modifying the parameters of the hybrid 
genetic algorithm to change over time, or be dependent on the size of the game is also an 
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